Mitchell Hamline Law Review
Volume 45

Issue 2

Article 2

2019

The Winter of Discontent: A Circumscribed Chevron
Nicholas R. Bednar

Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Judges Commons, Legislation Commons, and the
President/Executive Department Commons

Recommended Citation
Bednar, Nicholas R. (2019) "The Winter of Discontent: A Circumscribed Chevron," Mitchell Hamline Law
Review: Vol. 45 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law Reviews and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open
Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mitchell
Hamline Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information,
please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

THE WINTER OF DISCONTENT: A CIRCUMSCRIBED

CHEVRON
Nicholas R. Bednar†
Now is the winter of our discontent
Made glorious summer by this sun of York;
And all the clouds that lour’d upon our house
In the deep bosom of the ocean buried.1
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INTRODUCTION

Anti-administrativists are poised for a coup d’état. For the last thirty
years, courts have deferred to federal agencies’ interpretations of law while
rarely considering the constitutionality of the delegation underlying the
agencies’ policymaking authority.2 In recent years, the Supreme Court’s
† Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University;
University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. 2016.
1. William Shakespeare, Richard III act 1, sc. 1.
2. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 30 (2017) (showing that agencies win in 77.4 percent of cases where circuit courts
applied Chevron); Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “with Teeth”: Heightened Judicial
Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1607 (2014)
(“Aggressive judicial review of agency action peaked in the mid-twentieth century. Over
time, although there has been wide variation among and within jurisdictions, the general
trend has been towards leniency.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
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anti-administrativists—Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito,
Justice Gorsuch—have called for reconsideration of administrative law’s
core doctrines and constitutional roots.3 With the appointment of Justice
Kavanaugh, the anti-administrativists now have a majority on the Supreme
Court.4 Accordingly, administrative law scholars and practitioners should
anticipate a doctrinal revolution during the next decade.
I use “anti-administrativists”5 as shorthand for individuals who believe
modern administrative law requires reform to ensure fidelity to the United
States Constitution and the rule of law. In the words of Aaron Nielson,
anti-administrativists argue that “administrative law can be better as a
matter of procedural fairness, substantive outcomes, and compliance with
statutory and constitutional law.”6 At the core of anti-administrative
ideology is the belief that bureaucratic governance frustrates the separation
of powers. Agencies exercise the enumerated powers of the other
branches by promulgating binding rules like Congress,7 interpreting
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1129 (2008) (showing that agencies win in
76.2 percent of cases where the Supreme Court applied Chevron).
3. See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“[W]hether
Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another day.”); Oil States Energy
Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1381 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the PTAB violates Article III); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135
S. Ct. 1199, 1210–11 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“I await a case in which the validity of
Seminole Rock may be explored through full briefing and argument.”); Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.) (holding that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act interferes with the President’s constitutional obligations); Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 486–87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“On a future
day, however, I would be willing to address the question whether our delegation
jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ understanding of separation of
powers.”).
4. Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation
of
Powers,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Jul.
26,
2018,
2:55
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-administrative-law-and-separation-ofpowers [https://perma.cc/8XXA-LHZ2].
5. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (using this phrase).
6. Aaron L. Nielson, Confessions of an “Anti-Administrativist,” 131 HARV. L. REV.
F. 1, 1 (2017).
7. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (“I am persuaded that it would be both wiser and more faithful to
what we have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is
‘legislative power.’”); Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I believe that there are cases in
which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply
too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”); Gary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 378–95 (2002) (identifying
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statutes like courts,8 and—with respect to independent agencies—acting
outside the reaches of presidential oversight.9 The strongest antiadministrativists argue that the entire foundation of the modern
administrative state violates basic principles of the Constitution.10 More
lenient anti-administrativists acknowledge that delegation has become an
integral part of modern government but insist on strict oversight of
agencies.11
To be clear, one should not interpret the phrase “antiadministrativist” as pejorative. While I do not self-identify as an antiadministrativist,12 I sympathize with their concerns. We should strive for a
system of government that embraces efficiency, expertise, transparency,

numerous situations where Congress delegated broad “legislative” authority to
administrative agencies).
8. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“Today, the government invites us to retreat from the promise of judicial
independence. Until recently, most everyone considered an issued patent a personal right—
no less than a home or farm—that the federal government could revoke only with the
concurrence of independent judges. But in the statute before us Congress has tapped an
executive agency, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, for the job.”); Stephen Breyer,
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986) (arguing
that current standards of review for agency actions swap the intended role for the judiciary).
9. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (“The President cannot ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who
execute them.”); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT WITH SPECIAL
STUDIES
40–
41 (1937), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015019768939;view=1up;seq=62
[https://perma.cc/XXE4-529M] (“The independent commissions present a serious
immediate problem. No administrative reorganization worthy of the name can leave
hanging in the air more than a dozen powerful, irresponsible agencies free to determine
policy and administer law. Any program to restore our constitutional ideal of a fully
coordinated Executive Branch responsible to the President must bring within the reach of
that responsible control all work done by these independent commissions which is not
judicial in nature.”).
10. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014)
(answering “Yes” to the question posed in the title).
11. See generally Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359
(2017) (arguing that Courts should accept delegation to remedy the undermining of
separation of powers).
12. Notably, I believe the historical record demonstrates that Congress has the
constitutional authority to “delegate” policymaking decisions to agencies, which the
agencies resolve through the rulemaking process. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW,
CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION:
FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002).
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and the separation of powers. Anti-administrativists have contributed
much to the dialogue about how our government should function. Now,
with a majority on the Supreme Court, they have the opportunity to
reshape administrative law in ways that comport with their ideology.
Anti-administrativists have already fired the first shots of the
revolution at the Chevron standard of review. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court announced
a two-step standard of review for assessing whether a court should defer to
an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.13 Chevron is
an easy target. It is the most cited case in administrative law.14 More
importantly, since its inception, jurists and scholars have warned that
Chevron has expanded bureaucratic authority by depriving the courts of
their power to interpret the law.15 In recent years, these concerns have led
many commentators to call on the Supreme Court to overturn the
Chevron doctrine and restore de novo review as the proper standard for
reviewing agency interpretations of law.16 Even Congress has proposed
legislation that would eliminate Chevron by amending the Administrative
Procedure Act to require reviewing courts to “decide de novo all relevant
questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions, and rules.”17
Yet it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will overturn Chevron.
Elsewhere, Kristin E. Hickman and I argue that deference is the inevitable
result of Congress’s delegation of policymaking authority to agencies.18 The
Supreme Court acknowledges that statutory interpretation “is often more a
question of policy than of law,”19 and policymaking belongs to the political

13.
14.

467 U.S. 837, 841–43 (1984).
Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO.
WASH L. REV. 1392, 1394 n.5 (2017) (calculating that, as of June 2017, Chevron had been
cited more than 81,000 times).
15. See generally Breyer, supra note 8, at 370–71; Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
452 (1989); Kenneth W. Starr et al., Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a
Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 350 (1987) (Cass R. Sunstein).
16. See generally Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now:
How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV.
779 (2010); Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016). But
see Jeffrey Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1975 (2016).
17. Separation of Powers Restoration Act, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016) (emphasis
added); see also Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1456–60 (discussing SOPRA’s
implications for judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes).
18. See generally Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14.
19. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991).
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branches—not the courts.20 Chief Justice Roberts agrees. Dissenting in City
of Arlington v. FCC, Chief Justice Roberts remarked, “Chevron
importantly guards against the Judiciary arrogating to itself policymaking
properly left, under the separation of powers, to the Executive.”21 Indeed,
courts have long deferred to agency interpretations of statutes to avoid
straying too far into the policymaking realm.22 Unless the Court revives the
nondelegation doctrine in its harshest form, Congress will continue to
delegate policymaking authority to agencies under incomplete statutes,
agencies will fill the gaps in those statutes, and courts will defer to the
agencies’ policy decisions.
However, Hickman and I never suggest that Chevron will live a
peaceful existence. If Chevron survives, how will it function when the
Supreme Court completes its anti-administrativist revolution? Although
Chevron’s boilerplate remains relatively consistent, its application varies
depending on which judge or justice authors the opinion.23 Chevron’s rigor
depends on how clear Congress must speak to foreclose deference, how
reasonable the agency’s interpretation must be to warrant deference, and
whether the judge applies a formalistic construction of the two steps.24
Even outside of the anti-administrativist critique, scholars have called on
the Supreme Court to provide lower courts with more guidance as to when
and how Chevron applies.25 An anti-administrativist Supreme Court
could—and undoubtedly will—weaken Chevron without disposing of it.

20. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 487 n.1 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) (“In a situation of this
kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare—the precursor
to the modern Department of Health & Human Services], rather than to the courts, the
primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term . . . . A reviewing court is not free
to set aside those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a
different manner.”); AT&T Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236 (1936) (stating the
Court is “not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who
have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers.”).
23. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1444–45 (describing Chevron as “just” a
standard of review).
24. Id. at 1446.
25. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1441, 1470 (2018) (“The Supreme Court, with plenty of theoretical
foundation to guide it, should look for ways to bring coherence to the Chevron
framework.”); Beermann, supra note 16, at 783 (“The Chevron opinion was poorly
constructed and unclear on basic issues such as the proper role of interpretation, legislative
history, and policy arguments. It is still not clear whether Chevron concerns review of
statutory interpretation or review of policy decisions.”).
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This article draws from current trends among anti-administrativists to
explore how the Supreme Court may curtail Chevron in future cases. That
is not to suggest that the Supreme Court will implement all of the changes
I identify here. Rather, this article is best understood as a menu of à la
carte options that the Supreme Court may use to address antiadministrativist concerns. The more limitations that the Supreme Court
orders, the less often lower courts will defer to agency interpretations of
law.
II. THE CRITIQUES AND PERSISTENCE OF CHEVRON

A.

The Chevron Standard

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc,26 provides courts with a two-step standard
for reviewing “an agency’s construction of [a] statute which it administers.”
At step one, the court asks whether “Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue.”27 The court employs all “traditional tools of
statutory construction” to ascertain Congress’s intent.28 If Congress’s intent
is clear, then the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”29 “The court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold
the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”30 But “if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court moves to
step two.31 At step two, the court determines whether the agency’s
interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”32 The
court must defer to the agency’s interpretation unless it is “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”33
However, the Chevron opinion itself provided little guidance to lower
courts as to when and how the standard applies. The Chevron Court
acknowledged that Congress may explicitly or implicitly delegate an issue
of statutory interpretation to the agency.34 With respect to explicit
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842.
Id. at 843 n.9.
Id. at 842–43.
Id. at 843 n.11.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 843.
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delegations, the Chevron Court stated, “If Congress has explicitly left a gap
for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”35 With
respect to implicit delegations, the Court stated, “a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”36
On the face of its opinion, the Chevron Court appears to have
created a single standard of review for both agency statutory interpretation
and agency gap-filling. Agencies engage in both statutory interpretation and
gap-filling while enforcing the law, but scholars treat them as distinct
agency actions. Statutory interpretation refers to the traditional exercise
whereby the court decides “what the law is.”37 Courts employ an
interpretive methodology—typically purposivism or textualism—and their
various tools (textual canons, substantive canons, legislative history, etc.) to
arrive at the “best meaning” of the statutory text. Yet some ambiguities
have no discernable “best meaning” because Congress intended for the
agency to fill the gaps in these statutes. Filling statutory gaps requires
policymaking, which is a task suited for the political branches. Courts have
long recognized the power of administrative agencies to fill gaps in
Congress’s statutory regimes.38 The historical distinction between statutory
interpretation and gap-filling has led some scholars to argue that the
Chevron Court intended to limit the application of Chevron to cases
involving gap-filling.39
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court has failed to adequately
explain Chevron’s scope. For more than fifteen years,40 lower courts
struggled to decide whether older standards of review remained good law,
whether the agency had to produce its interpretation through notice-andcomment rulemaking, and whether certain substantive questions (notably
those concerning interpretations of the agency’s scope of power) were
beyond deference.41 Finally, in a trilogy of cases, the Court announced that
35. Id. at 843–44.
36. Id. at 844.
37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
38. Ilan Wurman, The Specification Power (Aug. 6, 2018) (working paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226964
[https://perma.cc/NS4FMMAZ].
39. Id. at 22–27 (arguing that several pre-Chevron cases that appear to involve
statutory interpretation actually involve gap-filling).
40. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L. J. 833 (2001) (summarizing confusion around Chevron’s scope and addressing
how the Court might resolve this confusion).
41. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1404–05.
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Chevron applies when the agency promulgated its interpretation pursuant
to a statutory grant of authority to act with the force of law.42 Since these
initial cases, the Supreme Court has continued to refine Chevron’s scope
but, in doing so, has injected further nuance and confusion into the
doctrine.43
With respect to the substance of its two steps, the Supreme Court has
fared even worse.44 The circuit courts continue to differ as to which tools
are appropriate at step one. Most circuits examine legislative history at step
one,45 but the Third Circuit does not.46 Major disagreements persist over
whether and when substantive canons apply in the Chevron analysis.47
The confusion surrounding step one is not the fault of the Supreme
Court alone. Judges disagree about which interpretive ideology—textualism
or purposivism—best determines Congress’s intent.48 Judges also disagree
about the line between clarity and ambiguity.49 As Justice Scalia predicted
shortly after Chevron’s inauguration, future battles over acceptance of
agency interpretations of law would be fought over “[h]ow clear is clear?”50
In light of these disagreements, step one may take the form of a strong
textualist inquiry, a strong purposivist inquiry, a weak textualist inquiry, or
a weak purposivist inquiry.
The Supreme Court has provided even less guidance about the
contours of step two. Step two may embrace one of two inquiries. Step two
42. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
43. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (concluding that Chevron does
not apply to questions of “economic and political significance”); City of Arlington v. FCC,
569 U.S. 290, 306–07 (2013) (holding that Chevron applies to an agency’s interpretation of
the scope of its regulatory authority); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps
an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and
thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
44. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1419–23 (describing inconsistencies and
ambiguities within the Chevron opinion’s descriptions of the two steps).
45. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 781 F.3d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 2015); Sumpter v. Sec’y
of Labor, 763 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2014); Catawba Cty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 35
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
46. United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history
should not be considered at Chevron step one.”).
47. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1427.
48. Id. at 1446 (arguing that statutory ambiguity is unavoidable).
49. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation. Judging Statutes, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 2118, (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
50. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L. J. 511, 520–21 (1989).
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may ask “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”51 Under this view, step two acts as a secondary
interpretive analysis. However, this construction possibly renders step one
and step two redundant.52 Instead, step two may import the arbitrary-andcapricious standard of section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure
Act. This approach requires the agency to provide the policymaking
rationale for its interpretation.53 Since Chevron’s inception, courts have
expressed confusion about whether the Chevron Court intended the
interpretive or the arbitrary-and-capricious form of step two.54 The
Supreme Court has invalidated an agency’s interpretation at step two in
only four cases and, within these cases, has done little to explain step two’s
role. 55
In sum, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to how
Chevron should apply.56 Chevron is simply a standard of review, which—
like many other standards of review—evolves as judges apply it in new
situations.57 Many versions of Chevron have emerged over the years.
Chevron is malleable, and its malleability is perhaps its greatest asset for an
anti-administrativist Supreme Court.

B.

The Inevitability of Deference and Delegation

Chevron’s survival presumes that delegation survives. Deference is
the byproduct of delegation, and without delegation, the Supreme Court
can abandon deference.58 In theory, Congress could stop delegating
policymaking authority to administrative agencies. In reality, Congress
builds the scaffolding necessary for regulatory programs and leaves
agencies to use their expertise to finish the structure. Congressional staffers
51. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(emphasis added).
52. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009).
53. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1253, 1270 (1997).
54. 744 F.2d 133, 150–51, 151 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
55. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 25, at 1448–51 n.83 (discussing four cases:
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302
(2014); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); and AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366 (1999)).
56. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1418–41.
57. Id. at 1444–45 (quoting Martha S. Davis & Steven Alan Childress, Standards of
Review in Criminal Appeals: Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REV. 461,
561 (1986)).
58. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1453–56.
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routinely asks the implementing agency for assistance in drafting legislative
proposals to ensure that Congress provides the agency with a sufficient
foundation to implement the regulatory regime.59 Moreover, delegation
allows members of Congress to shift blame for politically undesirable
policies to administrative agencies.60 Even if Congress could stop
delegating, it is unlikely to do so. If the Supreme Court truly wishes to
jettison Chevron, it will need to revive the nondelegation doctrine.
However, a complete revival of the nondelegation doctrine also seems
unlikely.61
The traditional anti-administrativist narrative argues that the Supreme
Court readily enforced principles of nondelegation until the New Deal but
abandoned these principles shortly thereafter. John Locke professed that
the legislature—having been granted authority to make laws by the people—
“can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it
in other hands.”62 The Supreme Court recognized the Lockean
nondelegation principle in Article I’s Vesting Clause, which vests “[a]ll
legislative Powers”63 in Congress and, by implication, excludes the exercise
of legislative power by other branches.64 Beginning in 1887, Congress
began to reorganize the federal government by building a vast
administrative state to manage new regulatory programs that policed
business and transportation.65 The courts actively resisted the delegation of

59. Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377,
1388–89 (2017).
60. See SARAH BINDER & MARK SPINDEL, THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE: HOW
CONGRESS GOVERNS THE FEDERAL RESERVE 45–51 (2017) (describing this dynamic
between Congress and the Federal Reserve); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 52–54 (1974).
61. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1398.
62. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. XI, § 141 (1690).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
64. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693–94 (1892) (“The true
distinction . . . is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made.”) (quoting Cincinnati, W & Z. R.R. Co. v.
Comm’r of Clinton Cty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 88–89 (1852)). Some trace the origins of the
nondelegation doctrine to The Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1812). See RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (2010). However, the clearest statement of the
nondelegation rule comes from Field v. Clark.
65. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439 (2d ed. 1985)
(“[T]he development of administrative law seems mostly a contribution of the 20th
century. . . . The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887, has been
taken to be a kind of genesis.”); see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW
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policymaking authority to this “headless” fourth branch of government.66
At the climax of this narrative, in 1935, the Supreme Court struck down
New Deal legislation for violating the nondelegation doctrine.67 Shortly
thereafter, the Court stopped caring about unconstitutional delegations,
failing to invalidate even “easy kills.”68 By 1989, the Supreme Court had
interred the nondelegation doctrine.69
Whether the anti-administrativists’ narrative accurately portrays
history has little bearing on whether the Supreme Court will revive the
nondelegation doctrine.70 Indeed, many anti-administrativists continue to
point to The Federalist No. 47 and its decree that “[t]he accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny” as a sign that the
Founders intended for the Constitution to prevent delegations.71 At a
minimum, Chief Justice Roberts is undoubtedly correct that “[t]he
Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s ‘vast and varied federal
bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our
economic, social, and political activities.”72
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–
1920, at 285–92 (1982).
66. Metzger, supra note 5 (noting attacks on the administrative state by the Supreme
Court).
67. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
68. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1240 (1994).
69. Id. at 1240 (“The Supreme Court . . . has rejected so many delegation challenges
to so many utterly vacuous statutes that modern nondelegation decisions now simply recite
these past holdings and wearily move on.”); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 378–79 (1989).
70. For sources challenging this narrative, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531
U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that Article I does not “purport to
limit the authority of either [the Executive or the Legislature] to delegate authority to
others”); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 44–50 (2012); Keith E.
Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 379, 429–30 (2017) (conducting an empirical study of early nondelegation cases and
concluding that the courts never meaningfully enforced the doctrine); Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 12, at 1729–41 (evaluating the potential sources of legitimacy for the
nondelegation and coming up empty handed).
71. United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); City of
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 1877 (2013).
72. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 1878 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)).
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But even anti-administrativists acknowledge that “the Court does not
want to tear everything down.”73 In the end, as Gary Lawson suggests, “the
Court believes—possibly correctly—that the modern administrative state
could not function if Congress were actually required to make a significant
percentage of the fundamental policy decisions.”74 The Court itself has
acknowledged that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”75
Perhaps the administrative state has become too big to fail. During oral
arguments in the Supreme Court’s most recent nondelegation case, Gundy
v. United States, Justice Breyer expressed concerns that the petitioners’
approach to the nondelegation doctrine would require overturning the
300,000 regulations on the books.76
The Supreme Court’s anti-administrativists have more or less
acquiesced to delegation. Justice Alito suggests that “the formal reason why
the Court does not enforce the nondelegation doctrine with more vigilance
is that the other branches of Government have vested powers of their own
that can be used in ways that resemble lawmaking.”77 Meaningful
enforcement of the modern nondelegation doctrine requires assessing
when administrative policymaking strays too far into the realm of
“legislating.” As Justice Scalia stated in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’n, the Court has “almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to
those executing or applying the law.”78 To avoid directly tackling the
problem of delegation, conservatives often justify administrative
rulemaking as a constitutional exercise of the executive power incidental to
the enforcement of the law.79
73. Nielson, supra note 6, at 10.
74. Lawson, supra note 68, at 1241.
75. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
76. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7:18–9:1, Gundy v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
1260
(2018)
(No.
17-6086),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/176086_6khn.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2LN-BSEL]. But see id. at 8:18–19, 26:5–16
(questioning the accuracy of the 300,000 figure).
77. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
78. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (quoting
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
79. See Ass’n of Am. R.R. at 1237 (citing City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290,
328 n.4 (2013)); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475 (“It is true enough that the degree of agency
discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally
conferred.”).
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Although Justices Thomas and Gorsuch continue to endorse a revival
of the nondelegation doctrine, it seems improbable that the Supreme
Court will revive the doctrine in any meaningful way.80 It is quite possible
that the Supreme Court will begin to enforce the nondelegation doctrine
in the most egregious cases. The Court has one such opportunity during
the 2018-2019 term in Gundy v. United States.81 But few of the antiadministrativist justices appear to have interest in using the nondelegation
doctrine to wholly demolish the administrative state.
If delegation is here to stay, so too is deference.82 Kristin Hickman
and I argue, “Chevron is a byproduct of congressional delegation.”83 The
Chevron Court recognized that the interpretation of regulatory statutes
often involves policymaking:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of
the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In
such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of
the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches.”84
In other words, with or without Chevron, courts must defer to
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of statutes to avoid policymaking.85
Moreover, Congress wants agencies to use their policy and scientific
expertise to fill statutory gaps.86 Congressional staffers agree that Congress
80. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487 (“I am not convinced that the intelligible principle
doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power. I believe that there are cases in
which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply
too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”); United States v.
Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[H]ow do you know an impermissible
delegation of legislative authority when you see it? By its own telling, the Court has had a
hard time devising a satisfying answer. But the difficulty of the inquiry doesn’t mean it isn’t
worth the effort.” (citation omitted)).
81. Mila Sohoni, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with Nondelegation Challenge,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2018, 1:33 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argumentanalysis-justices-grapple-with-nondelegation-challenge [https://perma.cc/F2UA-YXXJ].
82. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1453.
83. Id. at 1443.
84. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
85. See Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1460.
86. Id. at 1454.
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intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies rather than the
courts.87 Deference is a necessary component of the administrative state
because it gives agencies flexibility to implement policy decisions and
courts an exit from cases that otherwise require them to intervene in the
policymaking process.

C.

Anti-Administrativist Critiques of Chevron

Accepting Chevron’s persistence, how should the Supreme Court
resolve concerns that Chevron transfers authority from the courts and
Congress in ways that frustrate the separation of powers?88
By far the most recurring critique of Chevron is that it transfers to
agencies the power to “say what the law is” by allowing them to engage in
near-binding statutory interpretation.89 Shortly after the Supreme Court
announced Chevron, Justice Breyer warned that a strong reading of the
standard would result in “a greater abdication of judicial responsibility to
interpret the law than seems wise.”90 More recently, in a concurring
opinion in Michigan v. EPA, Justice Thomas argued that Chevron “wrests
from Courts the ultimate interpretive authority to ‘say what the law is’ and
hands it over to the Executive” in violation of Article III.91 Philip
Hamburger places the blame on the judges who continue to defer to
agency interpretations of law, claiming that American judges have
“abandoned” the bench.92
These concerns were made even more complicated by the Supreme
Court’s holding in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Services.93 In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that “[a]
court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”94
Dissenting, Justice Scalia warned that the decision effectively allows the
87. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Shultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 994 (2013).
88. Kavanaugh, supra note 49, at 2150; Beermann, supra note 16, at 782–84.
89. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
90. Breyer, supra note 8, at 381.
91. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
92. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 316.
93. 545 U.S. 967, 982–85 (2005).
94. Id. at 982.
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agency to set aside binding precedent by reinterpreting the statute and
seeking deference.95 In the majority opinion, Justice Thomas disagreed,
arguing that the Court’s previous interpretation remains “binding law,” and
the agency—consistent with the Court’s finding of ambiguity—may change
its interpretation of the statute as the authoritative interpreter of the
statute.96
In a lengthy critique of Chevron and Brand X, then-Judge Gorsuch
argued that the Founders sought to prevent the politicization of the courts
by preventing the elected branches of government from overturning the
courts’ decisions.97 He expressed concerns that Brand X allows the
executive branch to reverse the court’s interpretation of the law.98 More
broadly, Gorsuch emphasized that Chevron abdicates judicial authority by
allowing agencies to create binding interpretations of statutes.99
Not all anti-administrativist judges seem concerned that Chevron
violates Article III. As Chief Justice Roberts observed in his dissent in City
of Arlington v. FCC, “We do not ignore [Marbury v. Madison] when we
afford an agency’s statutory interpretation Chevron deference; we respect
it. We give binding deference to permissible agency interpretations of
statutory ambiguities because Congress has delegated to the agency the
authority to interpret those ambiguities ‘with the force of law.’”100
One can avoid Chevron’s Article III concerns by restricting its
application to agency gap-filling. However, some view the gap-filling
framework as an effort to avoid the nondelegation doctrine. As Justice
Thomas stated in Michigan v. EPA, “Although acknowledging this fact
might allow us to escape the jaws of Article III’s Vesting Clause, it runs
headlong into the teeth of Article I’s, which vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted’ in Congress.”101 Cynthia Farina recognizes that Chevron
shifts policymaking authority from Congress to the President:
At stake in Chevron was the fate of one relatively small but not
insignificant slice of the regulatory power pie: the authority to
interpret the statutes that define the policy-making universe. The
Court’s resolution deliberately moves that power squarely into
95. Id. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 982–83.
97. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–50 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1152.
100. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 317 (2013) (quoting United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)).
101. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1).
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the President’s domain. By relinquishing the authority to
determine statutory “meaning” to agencies whenever Congress
has failed to speak clearly and precisely, Chevron enlarges the
quantum of administrative discretion potentially amenable to
direction from the White House. It then goes even further and
exhorts agencies to exercise this discretion, not by attempting to
intuit and realize the objectives of the statue’s enactors, but by
pursuing the regulatory agenda of the current Chief Executive.102
Likewise, Cass Sunstein calls Chevron “the quintessential
prodelegation canon” because it rests on an assumption of “implicit
delegations of interpretive (realistically, lawmaking) authority to
agencies.”103 Again, this concern resonates less with those judges who view
delegation as a modern necessity. To that end, Justice Kavanaugh sees a
role for Chevron in some cases:
All of that said, Chevron makes a lot of sense in certain
circumstances. It affords agencies discretion over how to
exercise authority delegated to them by Congress. . . . The
theory is that Congress delegates the decision to an executive
branch agency that makes the policy decision, and that the
courts should stay out of it for the most part. That all makes a
great deal of sense and, in some ways, represents the proper
conjunction of the Chevron and State Farm doctrines.104
Even Justice Gorsuch—an ardent fan of the nondelegation doctrine—
acknowledges that agencies have an inherent authority to fill gaps in
statutes.105
Anti-administrativists also argue that Chevron allows agencies to
expand the scope of their regulatory authority beyond Congress’s intended
delegation. Drawing from his personal experience in the White House,
Justice Kavanaugh states, “I can confidently say that Chevron encourages
the Executive Branch (whichever party controls it) to be extremely
aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statutory
authorizations and restraints.”106
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Arlington v. FCC
exacerbated these concerns. In that case, the Supreme Court held that
Chevron applies to agency’s interpretation of the scope of its regulatory

102. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 525 (1989) (emphasis added).
103. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329–30 (2000).
104. Kavanaugh, supra note 49, at 2152.
105.
106.

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016).
Kavanaugh, supra note 49, at 2150.
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authority.107 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia argued that there is no
distinction between “jurisdictional” interpretations (those that concern the
agency’s scope of authority) and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations:
The false dichotomy between “jurisdictional” and
“nonjurisdictional” agency interpretations may be no more than
a bogeyman, but it is dangerous all the same. . . . Make no
mistake—the ultimate target here is Chevron itself. Savvy
challengers of agency action would play the “jurisdictional” card
in every case. Some judges would be deceived by the specious,
but scary-sounding, “jurisdictional”-”nonjurisdictional” line;
others tempted by the prospect of making public policy by
prescribing the meaning of ambiguous statutory commands.
The effect would be to transfer any number of interpretive
decisions—archetypal Chevron questions, about how best to
construe an ambiguous term in light of competing policy
interests—from the agencies that administer the statutes to
federal courts.108
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s premonition may sound quite compelling to
those who seek to keep the power of statutory interpretation in the courts.
In a dissent joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, Chief Justice Roberts
warned of “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative
state.”109 Courts—not agencies—must decide whether Congress intended to
delegate authority for an agency to decide a particular ambiguity within a
statute.110 In sum, courts cannot “leave it to the agency to decide when it is
in charge.”111
Nathan Sales and Jonathan Adler offer a scholarly explanation as to
why agencies should not receive deference for interpretations of their
regulatory jurisdiction.112 According to Sales and Adler, deference to
jurisdictional interpretations interferes with the “legislative deal” by
allowing the agency to expand the scope of its statutory authority beyond
what the relevant interest groups may have intended.113 In sum, Sales and
Adler argue that deference to jurisdictional questions leads to agency selfaggrandizement and an unwarranted expansion of regulatory authority.114
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

City of Arlington v FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 1871–75 (2013).
Id. at 1872–73 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1883.
Id. at 1886.
Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497 (2009).
113. Id. at 1541–42.
114. Id. at 1551–54.
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As this section shows, there is no single strand of anti-administrativist
ideology. The justices each worry about different normative and
constitutional problems that arise from Chevron. Certain efforts to revise
Chevron will appeal to some anti-administrativists more than others. The
remainder of this article examines how an anti-administrativist Supreme
Court may pare Chevron’s scope and substance to reduce separation-ofpowers concerns.
III. CHEVRON’S SCOPE
Many of the anti-administrativists’ concerns relate to Chevron’s
scope. An expansive view of Chevron’s scope allows agencies to
unconstitutionally exercise the powers of the other branches of
government. For example, anti-administrativists argue that statutory
interpretation—as opposed to gap-filling—falls within the exclusive power of
the courts and cannot be exercised by administrative agencies. Moreover,
many anti-administrativists argue that Congress should decide the scope of
an agency’s authority, and Chevron should not enable agencies to
unilaterally expand their authority. This Part addresses how an antiadministrativist Supreme Court may curb Chevron’s scope to better
respect the separations of powers. Part II.A. examines how the Supreme
Court may use the major-questions doctrine to prevent agencies from
deciding “major” questions that the Court believes ought to be left to
Congress. Part II.B. describes how the Supreme Court may restore
judicial power by limiting Chevron’s application to gap-filling.

A.

The Major-Questions Doctrine

The major-questions doctrine prevents agencies from deciding
questions of “economic and political significance” without express
statutory approval from Congress.115
The doctrine finds its earliest roots in MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. AT&T Co.116 In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) permissibly interpreted
the Communications Act of 1934 in waiving rate-filing requirements for all
nondominant long-distance carriers.117 The petitioner—a nondominant
115. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (citation omitted). For more
thorough examinations of the major-questions doctrine, see generally Blake Emerson,

Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency
Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019 (2018).
116.
117.

512 U.S. 218 (1994).
Id. at 220.
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long-distance carrier—sought deference for the agency’s interpretation
because the statute permitted FCC to “modify” any of the Act’s rate-filing
requirements.118 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia observed that “[r]ate
filings are, in fact, the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated industry.”119
By exempting certain carriers from filing rates with the FCC, the agency
made it impossible for customers to enforce their rights against the
exempted carriers. Scalia reasoned, “It is highly unlikely that Congress
would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or
even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—and even more
unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as
permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”120
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court
declined to defer to a Food & Drug Administration (FDA) interpretation
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that permitted the agency to regulate
nicotine as a “drug” and tobacco products as “devices.”121 Writing for the
Court, Justice O’Connor reviewed the extensive history of tobacco
legislation and concluded that Congress viewed itself as the primary
regulator of tobacco and could not have intended for FDA to regulate
nicotine under the Act.122 Justice O’Connor drew from MCI
Telecommunications’s proposition that Congress would not leave to an
agency the choice of whether a whole industry is subject to a regulatory
scheme. Justice O’Connor described a general principle that “[i]n
extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding
that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation” of interpretive
authority.123 The Court was “obliged to defer not to the agency’s expansive
construction of the statute, but to Congress’ consistent judgment to deny
the FDA this power” in light of tobacco’s “unique political history.”124
Simply put, “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of
such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a
fashion.”125
Over a decade later, Chief Justice Roberts reinvigorated Brown &
Williamson Tobacco. In King v. Burwell, the Supreme Court considered
whether to defer to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) interpretation of

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 224 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203).
Id. at 231.
Id.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–29 (2000).
Id. at 144–57.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 160.
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the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to award tax credits under the
Affordable Care Act to individuals who purchased health insurance on a
federal exchange.126 Under normal circumstances, the Court reviews IRS
interpretations of the IRC under Chevron.127 But the Court refused to
apply Chevron in this case. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts
argued that the IRS’s interpretation did not warrant consideration under
Chevron because it concerned a question of “deep ‘economic and political
significance.’”128 As evidence of the question’s significance, he cited
concerns that the interpretation involved billions of dollars and affected
the healthcare plans of millions of people.129 He further reasoned that the
IRS “has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy” and, therefore,
Congress would have expressly stated if it wished the IRS to resolve this
question.130 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court still adopted the
interpretation advanced by the IRS as the best reading of the statute.
Shortly after the Court decided King v. Burwell, Kristin Hickman
argued that Chief Justice Robert used King v. Burwell to change Chevron’s
scope in a way that comported with his dissent in City of Arlington v.
FCC.131 In City of Arlington, Chief Justice Roberts argued that, in order for
Chevron to apply, Congress must have intended for the agency to resolve
the ambiguity in the specific statutory provision at issue.132 Hickman
speculated that King v. Burwell did not necessarily “signal a new beginning
for Brown & Williamson Tobacco’s extraordinary cases language as a new
limitation on Chevron’s scope.”133 “[I]f a majority of the Justices are not
really on board with the doctrinal adjustment, then much like Brown &
Williamson Tobacco, King v. Burwell will fade into obscurity as
doctrinally insignificant with respect to Chevron’s scope.”134 But she
acknowledged, “sometimes a decision will take on a life of its own.”135
Three years have passed, and we see signs that the major-questions
doctrine may persist as a permanent limitation on Chevron’s scope. Since
King v. Burwell, several lower courts have applied the major-questions
doctrine. In Texas v. United States, the Fifth Circuit considered whether
126. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015).
127. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011).
128. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
129. Id. at 2488–89.
130. Id. at 2489.
131. Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v.
Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 58 (2015).
132. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 1880–83 (2013).
133. Hickman, supra note 131, at 64.
134. Id. at 66.
135. Id. at 71.
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the Department of Homeland Security exceeded its statutory authority in
creating the Deferred Action for Parents of American and Lawful
Permanent Residents program (DAPA), which permitted certain
undocumented-immigrant parents of United States citizen children to
remain in the United States.136 The Fifth Circuit held that “DAPA
undoubtedly implicate[d] ‘questions of deep “economic and political
significance”’” because the program “would make 4.3 million otherwise
removable aliens eligible for lawful presence, employment authorization,
and associated benefits.”137 Similarly, in Chamber of Commerce v.
Department of Labor, the Fifth Circuit used the major-questions doctrine
at Chevron step two to invalidate the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule
to transform the workings of “trillion-dollar markets” for IRA investments,
annuities, and insurance products.138 These are just two examples.139
However, the most important post-King application comes from
then-Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit. Dissenting in United States
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, Judge Kavanaugh presented the most coherent
articulation of the major-questions doctrine.140 He began with an extensive
review of the Supreme Court cases invoking the major-questions doctrine
and the scholarly literature exploring this precedent.141 Following this
review, Judge Kavanaugh stated, “the major rules doctrine constitutes an
important principle of statutory interpretation in agency cases.”142 He then
described the standard as follows: “In order for the FCC to issue a major
rule, Congress must provide clear authorization. We therefore must
address two questions in this case: (1) Is the net neutrality rule a major
rule? (2) If so, has Congress clearly authorized the FCC to issue the net
neutrality rule?”143

136. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
137. Id. at 181 (citation omitted).
138. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir.
2018).
139. For further example of lower courts recognizing the major-questions doctrine as a
limitation on Chevron’s scope, see Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d
233, 291–92 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Gregory, J., concurring); New Mexico v. Dep’t of
Interior, 854 F.3d 1207, 1221–27 (10th Cir. 2017); Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor
Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777, 796–99 (2017) (discussing the application
of the major-questions doctrine in the lower courts after King v. Burwell).
140. United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing).
141. Id. at 419–22.
142. Id. at 422.
143. Id.
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In answering the first question, Judge Kavanaugh considered “the
amount of money involved for regulated and affected parties, the overall
impact on the economy, the number of people affected, . . . the degree of
congressional and public attention to the issue,” and whether the agency
relied on a long-extant statute to support a “bold new assertion of
regulatory authority.”144 Despite Judge Kavanaugh’s best efforts to draw a
workable standard from the Supreme Court’s precedent, he admitted, “To
be sure, determining whether a rule constitutes a major rule sometimes
has a bit of a ‘know it when you see it’ quality.”145 He concluded that the
FCC’s net-neutrality rule was a major rule because the rule had a
“staggering” impact on the economy, Congress had attempted to pass
legislation concerning net neutrality for years, and the FCC relied on the
Communications Act of 1934 to assert control over a twenty-first century
issue.146
He then turned to whether Congress clearly authorized the FCC to
promulgate the net-neutrality rule. Examining the Communications Act,
he noted that Congress “articulated a general philosophy of limited
regulation of the Internet” and that the FCC had adhered to that
philosophy until 2015 by classifying the Internet as an “information
service.”147 To create the net-neutrality regulations, FCC re-classified the
Internet as a “telecommunications service” in order to regulate internetservice providers as common carriers.148 Judge Kavanaugh concluded that
Congress did not clearly authorize such a classification because “the Act is
ambiguous about whether Internet service is an information service or a
telecommunications service.”149 Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent offers a
template for other courts seeking to invoke the major-questions doctrine.
Chief Judge Roberts and Judge Kavanaugh may not be the only antiadministrativist justices to adopt the major-questions doctrine. In his
concurrence in Whitman, Justice Thomas opined that the current
formulation of the nondelegation doctrine—the “intelligible principle”
standard—still permits too much cession of power because “there are cases
in which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the
delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be called anything
other than ‘legislative.’”150 The major-questions doctrine offers a partial
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 423–24.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 424.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001).
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remedy to Justice Thomas’s concerns. At the very least, the majorquestions doctrine prevents agencies from delegating politically and
economically significant decisions to themselves.
The major-questions doctrine pairs well with anti-administrativist
concerns about the delegation of too much authority to agencies. Kent
Barnett and Chris Walker argue that the major-questions doctrine
perfectly comports with the theoretical underpinnings of Chevron.151
Chevron applies when Congress has delegated authority to the agency to
resolve ambiguities or fill gaps in statutes. Absent delegation, however, the
agency lacks the authority to do either of these things. The majorquestions doctrine asks courts to stop and ask whether Congress really
intended for the agency to decide the issue before simply deferring to the
agency’s interpretation.152 It protects against situations where a territorial
agency seeks to unilaterally expand its authority into new policy areas.153
The doctrine also acts as a complement to the nondelegation
doctrine by demanding that Congress specify when it wants an agency to
decide a significant question. Major questions look like major
delegations.154 If Congress revises the statute and explicitly delegates to the
agency the authority to decide the major issue, a reviewing court can
decide whether the delegation violates the nondelegation doctrine—
assuming the Supreme Court breathes life into the nondelegation doctrine.
Until then, the major-questions doctrine acts as a check on agencies from
unilaterally expanding their authority beyond the metes and bounds
envisioned by Congress.

B.

Interpretation v. Gap-Filling

As described above, Chevron applies to agency statutory
interpretation and gap-filling. The administrative state is replete with
examples of statutes that require gap-filling. Congress does not want to
decide what constitutes a “safe drug,” a “reasonable hazard,” or a

151. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Short-Circuiting the New Major
Questions Doctrine, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147, 155 (2017).
152. Id. at 156.
153. Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983, 993
(2017) (“Where it is unlikely or implausible that Congress would have delegated
interpretive authority to an administrative agency, there should be no Chevron
deference.”).
154. Coenen & Davis, supra note 139, at 806 (“When, in particular, a statutory
ambiguity implicates a ‘major question,’ the resolution of that ambiguity starts to look more
‘legislative’ in character.”).

416

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:2

“crashworthy automobile.”155 The courts are regularly called upon to
determine whether an agency has permissibly “interpreted” Congress’s
directive.156
Justice Kavanaugh argues that Chevron should only apply in
situations where the agency has engaged in gap-filling.157 He argues that
deference is appropriate “in cases involving statutes using broad and openended terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ feasible,’ or ‘practicable.’”158
Indeed, these terms are the hallmark signals of Congress’s intent for the
agency to fill a statutory gap. According to Justice Kavanaugh, courts have
a duty to ensure that the agency “choose[s] among reasonable options
allowed by the text of the statute” and to ensure that the agency has not
engaged in arbitrary-and-capricious decision-making.159
However, “in cases where an agency is instead interpreting a specific
statutory term or phrase, courts should determine whether the agency’s
interpretation is the best reading of the statutory text.”160 Absent these
restrictions on Chevron, Justice Kavanaugh fears that “[i]n certain major
Chevron cases, different judges will reach different results even though
they may actually agree on what is the best reading of the statutory text.”161
While still a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Justice Gorsuch
acknowledged that, even under the nondelegation doctrine, agencies
possess the authority to fill gaps in statutory regimes:
Congress can leave “details” to the Executive. Congress can’t
punt to the President the job of devising a competition code for
the chicken industry. Such widely applicable rules governing
private conduct must be enacted by the Legislature. But once
Congress enacts a detailed statutory scheme on its own—once it
says, for example, that margarine manufacturers must pay a tax
and place a stamp on their packages showing the tax has been
paid—Congress may leave to the President “details” like
designing an appropriate tax stamp.”162

155. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
WHY THEY DO IT 246 (1989).
156. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217–20 (2009).
157. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Note, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 2118, 2160 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
158. Id. at 2153.
159. Id. at 2153–54.
160. Id. at 2154.
161. Id. at 2153.
162. United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
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In Gutierrez-Brizuela, Justice Gorsuch suggested that Chevron would
serve as an acceptable standard if limited to situations where Congress
allowed the agency to fill the gaps in a statute.163
Limiting the application of Chevron to situations where the agency
has filled a gap in the statute restores the power of statutory interpretation
to the Judiciary. Recent work by Ilan Wurman suggests that the Founders
believed that the executive branch had an inherent constitutional power to
fill the gaps in statutes.164 Limiting Chevron’s application to cases where the
agency has filled a gap in a statute would preserve this historic
constitutional power. This limited Chevron keeps the courts away from
the policymaking inherent in gap-filling while restoring the Judiciary’s
power to “say what the law is.”
IV. STEP ONE

Chevron step one asks whether the intent of Congress is clear with
respect to the specific statutory provision at issue. Yet, the Supreme Court
has provided rather opaque instructions for step one.165 Is step one a
purposivist search for “the intent of Congress,” or is it a textualist search
for whether statutory text prevents the agency’s interpretation?166 How clear
must Congress’s intent be to foreclose deference at step one? These
uncertainties lend to the malleability of the Chevron standard of review.
Empirical work by Kent Barnett and Chris Walker demonstrates that
the circuit courts continue to leniently apply step one.167 Circuit courts
conclude their Chevron analyses at step one in thirty percent of cases.168 In
thirty-nine percent of cases resolved at step one, courts conclude that
Congress’s clear intent mandated the interpretation adopted by the
agency.169 When the courts reach step two, they defer to agency
interpretation at a rate of nearly ninety-four percent.170
163. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (“[W]e know Congress may allow the executive to resolve
‘details’ (like, say, the design of an appropriate tax stamp). Yet Chevron pretty clearly
involves neither of these kinds of executive functions and, in this way and as a historical
matter, appears instead to qualify as a violation of the separation of powers.”).
164. Wurman, supra note 38, at 37–41.
165. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1419–20 (parsing the Chevron opinion for
the meaning of step one).
166. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843
(1984).
167. Barnett & Walker, supra note 2, at 32–33.
168. Id. at 33.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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The leniency with which courts apply step one alarms antiadministrativists. Concurring in Pereira v. Sessions, Justice Kennedy
expressed concerns that persistent leniency results in great abdication of
judicial power:
In according Chevron deference to the [agency’s]
interpretation, some Courts of Appeals engaged in cursory
analysis of the questions whether, applying the ordinary tools of
statutory construction, Congress’s intent could be discerned,
and whether the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable. . . . This
analysis suggests an abdication of the Judiciary’s proper role in
interpreting federal statutes.
The type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases in
troubling.171
Anti-administrativists can restore the courts’ power to “say what the
law is” by strengthening step one. Justice Gorsuch has already begun this
process by engaging in “Chevron avoidance.” Since joining the Supreme
Court, Justice Gorsuch has authored the majority opinion in three
Chevron cases and has never deferred to the agency’s interpretation.172 In
two cases, Justice Gorsuch applied such a strong step one that it calls into
question whether Justice Gorsuch would ever find ambiguity. In SAS
Institute v. Iancu, Justice Gorsuch used traditional textualist tools to reject
the agency’s interpretation at step one, concluding that “[t]he statutory
provisions before us deliver unmistakable commands.”173 Justice Gorsuch
waited to address Chevron’s applicability until after completing this
interpretive analysis.174 In Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, Justice
Gorsuch again engaged in a robust textualist analysis to foreclose
deference at step one.175 Again, he waited until the last moment to cite

171. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (citations omitted).
172. See Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018); Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629–30 (2018); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348,
1358 (2018).
173. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1358. For a longer discussion of SAS Institute v.
Iancu, see Nicholas R. Bednar, Coping with Chevron: Justice Gorsuch’s Majority and
Justice Breyer’s Dissent in SAS Institute, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 25,
2018),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/coping-with-chevron-justice-gorsuchs-majority-and-justicebreyers-dissent-in-sas-institute-by-nicholas-r-bednar [https://perma.cc/W4A6-KC2B].
174. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1358 (“Even under Chevron, we owe an agency’s
interpretation of the law no deference unless, after ‘employing traditional tools of statutory
construction,’ we find ourselves unable to discern Congress’s meaning.” (quoting Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))).
175. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2070–74.
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Chevron as the standard of review, stating that the statute was “clear
enough.”176
There are three ways to understand Justice Gorsuch’s Chevronavoidance approach. First, the Supreme Court is biding its time until it can
overrule Chevron for good. In SAS Institute Inc., the petitioner argued
that the Court should “embrace the ‘impressive body’ of pre-Chevron law
recognizing that ‘the meaning of a statutory term’ is properly a matter for
‘judicial rather than administrative judgment.’”177 Other justices do not
seem to sympathize with this plan. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kavanaugh have noted the important role Chevron plays in
preventing courts from engaging in policymaking. The Supreme Court
may have the votes to curb Chevron’s strength, but it likely lacks the votes
to overturn Chevron.
Second, the Supreme Court may preserve Chevron as a tool to
restrain lower-court decision-making while exercising de novo review
itself.178 Adrian Vermeule states that it “is easy to imagine a situation in
which the Justices more or less require lower courts to apply Chevron
(within bounds), but interpret statutes de novo themselves.”179 That the
Supreme Court would apply a different Chevron standard from the lower
courts is not unfounded. Kent Barnett and Chris Walker observe notable
differences between Supreme Court applications (Chevron Supreme) and
circuit court applications of Chevron (Chevron Regular).180 They argue,
“Chevron Supreme, with its comparatively broader discretion, will shift
power from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court and agencies but leave
Chevron Regular in place to create more certainty in the lower courts and,
thus, greater national uniformity in federal administrative law.”181
Moreover, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis argue that there are
normatively appealing reasons to have two Chevron standards: one for the
Supreme Court and the other for the lower courts.182
A dissent from Justice Alito provides reasons to doubt that the
justices will strike an in camera deal to review agency interpretations de
novo at the Supreme Court. In Pereira v. Sessions, a majority of eight
176. Id. at 2074.
177. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1358 (citations omitted).
178. Barnett & Walker, supra note 151, at 70–73.
179. Adrian Vermeule (@Vermeullarmine), TWITTER (July 6, 2018, 8:23 AM),
https://twitter.com/Vermeullarmine/status/1015255019023667200 [https://perma.cc/GRJ6NRMC]. It is rather surreal to cite tweets as sources of debate in administrative law. Yet,
Twitter has a rather active administrative law community.
180. Barnett & Walker, supra note 151, at 70–73.
181. Id. at 73.
182. See generally Coenen & Davis, supra note 139, at 799–820.
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Justices concluded that they need not review the statute under Chevron
because the statute was clear.183 Justice Alito accused the Court of ignoring
Chevron:
Although this case presents a narrow and technical issue of
immigration law, the Court’s decision implicates the status of an
important, frequently invoked, once celebrated, and now
increasingly maligned precedent, namely, Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). . . . Here, a straightforward application of Chevron
requires us to accept the Government’s construction of the
provision at issue. But the Court rejects the Government’s
interpretation in favor of one that it regards as the best reading
of the statute. I can only conclude that the Court, for whatever
reason, is simply ignoring Chevron.
....
In recent years, several Members of this Court have
questioned Chevron’s foundations. But unless the Court has
overruled Chevron in a secret decision that has somehow
escaped my attention, it remains good law.184
The third and most likely option is that the Supreme Court simply
strengthens step one to require an aggressive search for clarity.185
What does a more searching inquiry look like if the Supreme Court
limits Chevron to situations where the agency has engaged in gap-filling?
The existence of a gap implies that the agency may select a policy within a
range permitted by the statute. However, the agency cannot decide to
adopt a policy that conflicts with Congress’s clear intent. As revised, step
one asks whether the agency’s decision falls within the range of permissible
policy choices.186 The court rejects the agency’s decision if the statute
prohibits the agency’s interpretation. As Justice Scalia has quipped, “It
does not matter whether the word ‘yellow’ is ambiguous when the agency
interpreted it to mean ‘purple.’”187 A textualist formulation would ask
whether the statute’s text clearly prohibits the agency’s decision. A
purposivist formulation would ask whether evidence of congressional
intent and the statute’s purpose clearly prohibit the agency’s decision.

183. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (2018).
184. Id. at 2121, 2129 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
185. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1423.
186. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 VA. L. REV. 597, 598–600 (2009) (describing two conceptions of step one that work in
unison).
187. 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.
illustrates what step one looks like when a court reviews an agency’s gapfilling. That case concerned the EPA’s interpretation of the phrase “best
technology available” in the Clean Water Act to allow for consideration of
cost-benefit variances.188 Justice Scalia noted the ambiguity in the phrase
“best technology available,” which could mean either the technology that
produces the most of some good or the technology that most efficiently
produces some good.189 Other provisions of the Clean Water Act expressly
permit the EPA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.190 Yet Justice Scalia
rejected the dissent’s argument that these provisions showed that
Congress’s silence sought to foreclose a cost-benefit analysis with respect
to this provision. Justice Scalia stated, “It is eminently reasonable to
conclude that [the statutory provision’s] silence is meant to convey nothing
more than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands as to whether cost-benefit
analysis should be used, and if so to what degree.”191 He therefore
concluded, “it was well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation for
the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit analysis is not categorically
forbidden.”192
Justice Scalia’s opinion generally shows how step one applies in gapfilling cases. However, one can imagine that anti-administrativists will more
easily find that the agency’s hands are tied with a more aggressive step one.
V. STEP TWO
Most Chevron skeptics focus on narrowing Chevron’s scope and
increasing the strength of step one. Indeed, the Supreme Court could
condense the standard into a single step, stating: “Unless refuted by clear
language of the statute, a court must defer to the agency interpretation.”193
As a result, anti-administrativist jurists have paid little attention to
Chevron’s second step. Yet further refinement of step two may better
increase judicial oversight of agency policymaking.
The Supreme Court’s step two analyses lack a coherent pattern from
which to draw a single meaningful standard. This has led to confusion
about the substance of step two in the lower courts. Chris Walker and
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217 (2009).
Id. at 218.
Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 223.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618 (1992); see also
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 186 (proposing a one-step Chevron).
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Kent Barnett have recently composed a typology of three ways the lower
courts apply step two: (1) a hypertextualist approach, (2) a
hyperpurposivist approach, and (3) an arbitrary-and-capricious approach.194
A hypertextualist step two uses textualist tools to examine whether the
agency’s decision is reasonable in light of the statute’s text.195 Some
commentators lament that a hypertextualist step two conflates steps one
and two because it is redundant with the interpretive inquiry of step one.196
Redundancy increases if the anti-administrativists endorse a robust step
one. Accordingly, a hypertextualist step two offers little for antiadministrativists who seek more opportunities to scrutinize agency action.
A hyperpurposivist step two asks whether the agency’s interpretation
comports with the statute’s purpose.197 An agency’s interpretation that
conflicts with the statute’s purpose may survive a textualist step one if the
agency adopts a textually permissible interpretation. A hyperpurposivist
approach provides courts an opportunity to use purposivist tools—perhaps
legislative history and substantive canons—that may otherwise fall to the
wayside at step one.
A hyperpurposivist approach to step two may appeal to Chief Justice
Roberts, who emphasizes statutory purpose in statutory interpretation.
Looking at his decision in King v. Burwell, Stephanie Hoffer and Chris
Walker note that Roberts “seem[s] to be embracing a brand of
contextualism that departs from the textualism that has predominated
during Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Court.”198 In King v. Burwell, Roberts
emphasized that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair
understanding of the legislative plan.”199 The hyperpurposivist approach to
step two asks whether the agency’s interpretation or decision comports
with that “legislative plan.”
Finally, step two may embrace the Administrative Procedure Act’s
arbitrary-and-capricious standard by asking whether the agency arrived at
its decision through reasoned decision-making.200 Rather than asking
whether the agency’s interpretation comports with the statute’s text and
purpose, an arbitrary-and-capricious approach asks whether the agency has
provided sufficient reasoning to support its interpretation. This approach

194. Barnett & Walker, supra note 25, at 1451–55.
195. Id. at 1451–52.
196. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 186, at 599.
197. Barnett & Walker, supra note 25, at 1452–53.
198. Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer?
2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 34 (2015).
199. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
200. Barnett & Walker, supra note 25, at 1454.
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requires agencies to engage in a traditional policy assessment, such as
factfinding and cost-benefit analysis, to support its decision. This approach
ensures that the agency’s interpretation reflects its expertise rather than
other irrelevant considerations.201
It is difficult to predict whether the Supreme Court will ultimately
adopt the hyperpurposivist approach or the arbitrary-and-capricious
approach. However, if the anti-administrativist Court gets an opportunity
to refine step two, one should expect that the Court will sharpen step two’s
teeth.
VI. CONCLUSION

Chevron—or at least deference more generally—will not go away. This
article has described the various options an anti-administrativist Supreme
Court has for creating a more rigorous Chevron standard of review. The
Supreme Court can restore the power of statutory interpretation to the
courts by limiting Chevron’s application to situations where an agency has
filled a gap in the statute. The Court also can prevent agencies from
exercising substantial policymaking power by invoking the major-questions
doctrine where Congress has not explicitly called upon the agency to
decide a significant political and economic issue. Substantively, the Court
can prevent lower courts from engaging in “reflexive deference”202 by
clarifying the analytical requirements of Chevron’s two steps.
The Supreme Court will not necessarily adopt all of these changes.
However, an anti-administrativist Supreme Court has the potential to
create an incredibly robust Chevron standard of review without wholly
eliminating it. Scholars can debate whether all of these limitations make
Chevron unworkable. However, the ways things stand, it is more likely that
the Supreme Court will tack additional limitations onto Chevron before
abandoning the doctrine all together.

201. Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2359, 2438 (2018).
202. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018).
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